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Abstract
The replacement theorem for classical and normal modal logics is a fundamental tool. It says
that if A and B have been proved equivalent, occurrences of A in a formula may be replaced
with occurrences of B to produce a formula equivalent to the original one. This theorem does
not hold for LP, Logic of Proofs. A replacement for replacement is not simple to formulate. In
this note I have provided one, along with some machinery for working with LP realizations that
may prove useful for other things as well.

1

Introduction

The logic LP (logic of proofs) was introduced by Artemov, see [2]. It is a propositional modallike logic that was introduced to help solve a problem originating with Gödel: provide a natural
arithmetic foundation for intuitionistic logic, [4]. LP plays a central role in doing that. But it
also proves to be an interesting logic for its own sake, a logic of explicit evidence. It is, however,
a difficult logic to work with. Semantics, see [3], is more complex than that of standard modal
logics, and the same applies to its proof theory. In this note I provide a proof-theoretic tool whose
counterpart for more conventional logics is almost trivial. But first, a small amount of background.
LP is a modal-like language, but instead of a single modal operator it has an infinite family
of them—they are called proof polynomials. If t is a proof polynomial and X is a formula, t:X
is another formula which can be read “t is a proof of X”, or “t is a reason for X”. Part of
the formal machinery of the logic is a calculus on proof polynomials. LP is intended to have a
close relationship with the normal modal logic S4, which in turn has a close relationship with
intuitionistic logic and, as Gödel observed, S4 necessity has the properties one associates with an
informal notion of provability. A formal connection between LP and arithmetic is made explicit
in Artemov’s Arithmetic Completeness Theorem. A formal connection between LP and S4 is
Artemov’s Realization Theorem. Loosely it says that each theorem of S4 can be converted into
a theorem of LP that expresses the constructive content of the S4 theorem. Negative occurrences
of  become proof variables and positive occerences of  become proof polynomials that may
involve those variables. A proper statement is in Theorem 2.1. For a thorough presentation of LP,
including motivation, see [2].
We commonly replace, in a formula Z(A), a subfomula A with another formula B that has
been proved to be equivalent to A, getting a new formula Z(B), and conclude that Z(A) and Z(B)
1
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are themselves equivalent. This is something we do all the time. But things are not so simple in
LP, where the subformula A of Z(A) may be embedded in a structure of reasons, represented by
proof polynomials. If A is replaced with B, reasons must be updated to reflect the original ones
combined with ones embodying the passage from A to B. Further, A may be present in different
parts of Z(A) for different reasons. All this can lead to considerable complexities. In this note I
provide a replacement for the usual replacement theorem, appropriate for LP.
One of the things accomplished in this paper is turning realizations into first-class mathematical
objects—essentially functions defined on occurrences of modal operators. In order to do this conveniently, an annotated version of S4 is introduced, in which distinct occurrences of the necessity
operator are syntactically different symbols. All this makes it easier to reason about realizations
and their behavior. I think it will be found to be a useful tool.
Since Artemov’s original work, the ideas of LP have been extended to a family of similar logics.
Thus S4 is not the only standard modal logic that has an LP-style analysis, and various multi-modal
logics have also been brought into the picture. Part of the motivation has been the desire to see
proof polynomials as explicit reasons in a sense that is more general than just formal proofs, with
applications to logics of knowledge. I do not address the whole family of LP-like logics here—
things are complicated enough. But it is clear that my methods do extend. My purpose is simply
to provide some proof-theoretic tools that make life simpler, even when reasons are made explicit.

2

The Logic LP

This section contains a brief formulation of LP axiomatically. A semantics will not be needed in
this paper. The language of LP, denoted LLP here, is built from the following basic machinery,
which appears in [2].
1. propositional variables, P , Q, P1 , P2 , . . .
2. propositional constant, ⊥
3. logical connective, ⊃
4. proof variables, x, y, x1 , x2 , . . .
5. proof constants, c, d, c1 , c2 , . . .
6. function symbols ! (monadic), ·, + (binary)
7. operator symbol of the type htermi:hformulai
Proof polynomials are built up from proof variables and proof constants, using the function
symbols. Ground proof polynomials are those without variables. Formulas are built up from
propositional variables and the propositional constant using ⊃ (with other connectives defined in
the usual way), and an extra rule of formation: if t is a proof polynomial and X is a formula then
t:X is a formula.
The formula t:X can be read: “t is a proof of X.” Proof constants intuitively represent proofs
of basic, assumed truths. Proof variables in a formula can be thought of as implicitly universally
quantified over proofs. If t is a proof of X ⊃ Y and u is a proof of X, we should think of t · u, the
application of t to u, as a proof of Y . The operation ! is a proof-checker: if t is a proof of X then
!t is a verification that t is such a proof. The operation + combines proofs in the sense that t + u
proves all the things that t proves plus all the things that u proves.
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The following axiom system for LP is from [1, 2] Axioms are specified by giving axiom schemas,
and these are:
A0.
A1.
A2.
A3.
A4.

Classical
Application
Reflexivity
Proof Checker
Sum

Classical propositional axiom schemes
t:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (s:X ⊃ (t·s):Y )
t:X ⊃ X
t:X ⊃ !t:(t:X)
s:X ⊃ (s+t):X
t:X ⊃ (s+t):X

Rules of inference include modus ponens, and a version of the necessitation rule, for axioms
only.
R1.
R2.

Modus Ponens
Axiom Necessitation

` Y provided ` X and ` X ⊃ Y
` c:X where X is an axiom A0 – A4
and c is a proof constant.

As usual, a proof is a finite sequence of formulas each of which is an axiom or comes from earlier
terms by one of the rules of inference. A notion of derivation can be introduced, either directly,
or indirectly by defining Γ ` X to mean (G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn ) ⊃ X is a theorem for some finite subset
{G1 , . . . , Gn } of Γ.
The specification of which constants are associated with which axioms for rule R2 applications
is called a constant specification. A constant specification is injective if each proof constant is
used for at most one axiom. Injective constant specifications suffice, but are not required. If
a proof uses an injective constant specification, I will say the proof is injective. In [3] constant
specifications were assumed to be given beforehand, and their properties were investigated in some
detail. Computational complexity is dependent on the properties of the constant specification. In
[2] things were more flexible, and constants were generally assigned during the course of a proof.
In this paper we use this flexible version.
The Realization Theorem plays a fundamental role for LP. If X is any theorem of LP, and
we replace every proof polynomial by  (the forgetful map), the result is a theorem of S4. This
much is easy to see: it is clearly the case for each axiom of LP, and is preserved by the LP rules of
derivation. The Realization Theorem is a converse to this.
Theorem 2.1 (Realization Theorem) If X is a theorem of S4, there is some way of replacing
 symbols with proof polynomials to produce a theorem of LP. Moreover this can be done so that
negative occurrences of  are always replaced with distinct proof variables, and positive occurrences
by proof polynomials that may involve those variables.
Negative occurrences of proof variables can be thought of as inputs, and the proof polynomials
involving them as outputs. Thus theorems of S4, in a sense, carry implicit constructive content
which their embeddings into LP make explicit.
Let us say the displayed occurrence of term t in the formula t:Z is self-referential if t has an
occurrence in Z. It is shown in [5] that constant specifications in which proof constants have selfreferential occurrences are needed for completeness. However, in what follows, I will generally need
to assume that we do not have self-referentiality for ‘input’ variables. I do not know, but strongly
suspect that the Realization Theorem can be proved in such a way that self-referentiality can be
avoided for variables in negative positions. This is intuitively reasonable. A negative occurrence of
a proof variable in a subformula, say x:Z, represents an input that can be freely specified. It is like
saying, “let x be an arbitrary proof of Z”. The formula Z should not, in turn, vary with different
choices of proofs for it.
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Definition 2.2 A substitution is a mapping, σ, from proof variables to proof polynomials. If σ is
a substitution and X is a formula, I will write Xσ for the result of replacing each proof variable x
in X with the proof polynomial xσ. Similarly for substitution in proof polynomials.
We will often need a special condition on substitutions—this is as good a place as any to
introduce it.
Definition 2.3 A substitution σ meets the no new variable condition provided, for each variable
x, the term xσ contains no variables other than x.
The following is shown in [2].
Theorem 2.4 (Substitution Lemma) If X is a theorem of LP, so is Xσ. Further, if X has an
injective proof, so will Xσ.
The constant specification used for proving X and that used for proving Xσ will, in general, be
different, but this fact can be safely ignored for what we do here.
A fundamental result that will be used over and over in this paper is the Lifting Lemma,
from [2], which says that proofs and derivations in LP can be internalized. The proof is actually
algorithmic—a proof polynomial t can be explicitly constructed from any given LP derivation.
Theorem 2.5 (Lifting Lemma) Suppose
s1:X1 , . . . , sn:Xn , Y1 , . . . , Yk ` Z
then there is a proof polynomial t(s1 , . . . , sn , y1 , . . . , yk ) (where the yi are variables) such that
s1:X1 , . . . , sn:Xn , y1:Y1 , . . . , yk:Yk ` t(s1 , . . . , sn , y1 , . . . , yk ):Z.
Moreover, if the original derivation was injective, the same is the case for the later derivation.
Corollary 2.6 If Z has an LP proof, then for some proof polynomial t with no proof variables, t:Z
will have an LP proof, injective if the proof of Z was injective.
The proof polynomial t in the Corollary above can always be taken so that it does not involve
the operator +. The standard proof, by induction on derivation length, constructively produces
such a polynomial. See [2] for details. I should note that + plays no role in anything shown in this
report.

3

Annotations and Realizations

In this section I introduce some simple machinery to keep track of modal operator occurrences. But
first we need modal operators in the standard sense. Let L be the usual language of propositional
modal logic, built up from propositional letters using ⊥, ⊃, and , with other connectives and ♦
taken as defined, in the usual way.
The LP Realization Theorem treats positive and negative occurrences of modal operators differently; negatives are replaced by proof variables while positives need not be. Further, different
negative occurrences in a formula are replaced with distinct variables. Generally all this has been
done somewhat informally, but machinery for it is straightforward. I introduce a language intermediate between L and LLP —though it is much closer to L . As will be seen, it amounts to
syntactic, and not semantic, machinery.
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Definition 3.1 The language La and its features are introduced as follows.
1. Instead of a single modal operator , there is an infinite family, 1 , 2 , . . . . These will be
called indexed modal operators. Formulas of La are built up as in L , but using indexed
modal operators instead of . Formulas of La will generally be referred to as annotated
formulas.
2. If X is an annotated formula, and X 0 is the result of replacing all indexed modal operators,
n , with , then X 0 is a formula of L . We say X is an annotated version of X 0 , and X 0 is
an unannotated version of X.
3. A properly annotated formula is an annotated formula meeting the conditions that: no indexed
modal operator occurs twice; and if n occurs in a negative position n is even, and if it occurs
in a positive position n is odd.
Example 3.2 The example that starts here will be continued throughout the rest of the report.
Here is an annotated formula.
2 (1 U ⊃ 4 (3 P ⊃ 6 V )) ⊃ 5 W

(1)

Note that this is, in fact, properly annotated.
One can think of a properly annotated formula as a bookkeeping device to keep track of occurrences of modal operators and their polarities—negative occurrences are even, positive occurrences
are odd. Properly annotated formulas play a fundamental role, but it is important to note that
formulas that are annotated but not properly so also arise naturally. For instance, if X is properly
annotated and Y is a subformula, it may not itself be properly annotated—it will not be if Y is a
negative subformula of X because polarities have been reversed in passing from X to Y . Generally
we will fix a properly annotated formula X, and work with subformulas of it, all of which are
annotated, and properly so when considered as subformulas of X.
Semantically, annotations are simply ignored. That is, in an S4 model M = hG, R, i we use
the following rule of evaluation:
M, Γ

n X ⇐⇒ M, ∆

X for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆

Then in a model, an annotated formula X and its unannotated version X 0 behave alike at each
world. As I remarked earlier, annotations are for syntactical and not for semantical purposes.
Now that we have annotated formulas, realizations can be defined functionally in a natural way.
Definition 3.3 Realization functions and related notions are defined as follows.
1. A realization function is a mapping from positive integers to proof polynomials that maps
even integers to LP variables. It is assumed that all realization functions behave the same on
the even integers, specifically, if r is any realization function, r(2n) = xn , where x1 , x2 , . . . is
the list of proof variables arranged in a standardized order.
2. If X is a formula of La , an annotated formula, and r is a realization function, by r(X) is
meant the result of replacing each modal operator i in X with the proof polynomial r(i).
The result, r(X) is formula of LP.
3. Let X be an annotated formula. We say the realization function r is non self-referential on
variables in X provided, for each subformula 2n Y of X the variable r(2n) = xn does not
occur in r(Y ).

6

Melvin Fitting

Example 3.4 Let r be a realization function such that the following holds, where f , g, h, and
k are particular proof polynomials that need not be fully specified for present purposes, and the
behavior of r on other inputs is not specified.
r(1) = g(x2 , x3 , x5 )
r(2) = x1
r(3) = f (x3 )

r(4) = x2
r(5) = h(x1 , x2 , x3 )
r(6) = x3

(2)

Let X(P ) be formula (1) from Example 3.2 (later on P will play a special role, though it does not
at the moment). Then we have the following. Note that r is non self-referential on variables in
X(P ).
r(X(P )) = x1:[g(x2 , x3 , x5 ):U ⊃ x2:(f (x3 ):P ⊃ x3:V )] ⊃ h(x1 , x2 , x3 ):W
(3)
Finally, here is our official definition of a realization. In practice we will be working with
realization functions that are non self-referential on variables, but this has not been built into the
definition.
Definition 3.5 If X is a formula of L , a conventional modal formula, a realization of X is any
formula of LP of the form r(X 0 ) where r is a realization function and X 0 is any properly annotated
version of X.

4

The Replacement Theorem

In S4 (and in normal modal logics generally) one can prove a replacement result: If A ≡ B is
provable, and X(B) is like X(A) except that some subformula occurrences of A have been replaced
with B, then X(A) ≡ X(B) is also provable. Equivalence plays a central role here, and this has its
problems for LP. If A ≡ B is expanded into a formula in conjunctive normal form, one sees that A
occurs both positively and negatively. Since positive and negative occurrences of modal operators
play different roles when realized in LP, any LP analog of the replacement result in a form that
uses equivalence should not be expected. There is, however, a version of replacement for normal
modal logics that is less problematic. If X(B) is like X(A) except that some positive occurrences
of A have been replaced with B, then if A ⊃ B is provable so is X(A) ⊃ X(B). Here is a formal
statement of it, in a version that introduces notation that is useful for its proof.
Proposition 4.1 Let ϕ(P ) be a formula of L in which the propositional letter P has only positive
occurrences. Let ϕ(Z) be the result of replacing occurrences of P with occurrences of the L formula
Z. Then, if A ⊃ B is provable in S4, so is ϕ(A) ⊃ ϕ(B).
In this form, Replacement respects polarity of subformula occurrence. There is one more minor
problem before we get to the serious ones for an LP analog. The Proposition allows for the replacement of several occurrences of A with occurrences of B. We will be interested in using properly
annotated formulas. But if ϕ(P ) and A are both properly annotated, and A actually contains
indexed modal operators, ϕ(A) can never be properly annotated if P occurs more than once in
ϕ(P ). Very simply, the requirement on proper annotations that no indexed modal operator occurs
more than once would be violated in ϕ(A). So we must restrict ourselves to the replacement of
single occurrences of subformulas. Of course multiple replacements can be done sequentially.
Now we get to the serious matters. Proof polynomials represent reasons. If A is replaced with
B inside a more complex LP formula, reasons for A must be adjusted to incorporate reasons for
the passage from A to B, reasons for subformulas containing reasons for A need adjustment, and
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so on up. A version of Replacement for LP is not simple to formulate. In this section I do provide
such a result, and prove it.
In order to state a version of Replacement for LP in a way that is not too complex to be
comprehended, I will make use of annotated formulas and realization functions. After all, every LP
formula with distinct variables in negative positions can be expressed as r(X) for some realization
function r and some properly annotated formula X. Indeed, if we drop the requirement that X be
properly annotated, every LP formula is of the form r(X) for suitable r and X.
There is one more piece of complexity that should be discussed before launching into the formal
details. We care about proper annotation but, as noted earlier, subformulas of a properly annotated
formula need not be properly annotated. In order to deal with this, we fix a formula X that is
properly annotated, and work with subformulas of X which are properly annotated within X, but
may not be when considered on their own.
In what follows, if ϕ(P ) is an annotated formula and P is a propositional letter, ϕ(A) is the
result of replacing all occurrences of P in ϕ(P ) with occurrences of the annotated formula A.
Definition 4.2 Let X(P ) be an annotated formula in which the propositional letter P has one
positive occurrence, let A and B be annotated formulas, let r be a realization function, and let
ϕ(P ) be a subformula of X(P ). For a realization function rϕ and a substitution σϕ , we say hrϕ , σϕ i
replaces r(A) with r(B) at P in ϕ(P ) within X(P ) provided:
1. if ϕ(P ) is a positive subformula of X(P ) then r(ϕ(A))σϕ ⊃ rϕ (ϕ(B)) has an injective LP
proof;
2. if ϕ(P ) is a negative subformula of X(P ) then rϕ (ϕ(B)) ⊃ r(ϕ(A))σϕ has an injective LP
proof;
3. r(B) = rϕ (B)
Theorem 4.3 (Replacement For LP) Assume the following.
1. X(P ) is an annotated formula in which the propositional letter P has one positive occurrence,
A and B are annotated formulas;
2. X(B) is properly annotated;
3. r is a realization function that is non self-referential on variables in X(A);
4. r(A) ⊃ r(B) has an injective LP proof.
Then for each subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ) there is some hrϕ , σϕ i that replaces r(A) with r(B) at P
in ϕ(P ) within X(P ).
A few words before we start the proof. Loosely the theorem says that if we replace a positive
occurrence of r(A) in r(ϕ(A)) with an occurrence of r(B), and if r(A) implies r(B), we get a
provable implication, not between r(ϕ(A)) and r(ϕ(B)), but between formulas that are similar to
these, but with adjusted proof polynomials. As will be seen, positive and negative proof polynomials
are adjusted separately; the substitution σϕ takes care of negative polynomial occurrences (proof
variables) while the realization function rϕ takes care of positive polynomial occurrences.
Example 4.4 We continue Example 3.4. Suppose we take A to be 7 R and B to be 9 11 R, so
that we have the following.
A ⊃ B is 7 R ⊃ 9 11 R

(4)
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Note that with X(P ) from (1) we have
X(A) is 2 (1 U ⊃ 4 (3 7 R ⊃ 6 V )) ⊃ 5 W

(5)

X(B) is 2 (1 U ⊃ 4 (3 9 11 R ⊃ 6 V )) ⊃ 5 W

(6)

and both are properly annotated. Also let us specify more of the realization function r that was
partly given in (2).
r(7) = k(x3 )
r(9) =!k(x3 )

(7)

r(11) = k(x3 )
Then r is non self-referential on variables in X(A), and we have the following.
r(X(A)) = x1:[g(x2 , x3 , x5 ):U ⊃ x2:(f (x3 ):k(x3 ):R ⊃ x3:V )] ⊃ h(x1 , x2 , x3 ):W

(8)

Also r(A) ⊃ r(B) is k(x3 ):R ⊃!k(x3 ):k(x3 ):R and this has an injective LP proof.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 is lengthy and detailed, but it actually does something stronger than
is stated: it provides an algorithm for the construction of the pair hrϕ , σϕ i. This algorithm is rather
straightforward; the bulk of the proof is devoted to showing the correctness of the algorithm. It
should be noted that the operations + and ! play no role here.
Proof Let X(P ) be a given formula, and assume conditions 1 – 4 hold. The result will be shown
by an induction on the complexity of ϕ(P ), but actually something slightly stronger must be
established, and for this we need some terminology. Let Z be an annotated formula; we say a
substitution σ lives on Z provided the only variables that σ changes are xi where 2i occurs in Z.
Now, call a subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ) good provided there is some hrϕ , σϕ i that replaces r(A) with
r(B) at P in ϕ(P ) within X(P ), and where σϕ lives on ϕ(P ); we also say hrϕ , σϕ i is a witness to
the goodness of ϕ(P ). We will show every subformula of X(P ) is good.
Let ϕ(P ) be a subformula of X(P ), and suppose that all its proper subformulas are good—we
show ϕ(P ) itself is good. There are several cases to consider.
Case: P does not occur in ϕ(P ), so that ϕ(P ) = ϕ(A) = ϕ(B). In this case we do not actually
need the induction hypothesis. Set rϕ = r and σϕ to be the identity substitution, which
lives on every formula. Then both [r(ϕ(A))]σϕ ⊃ rϕ (ϕ(B)) and rϕ (ϕ(B)) ⊃ [r(ϕ(A))]σϕ are
simply r(ϕ(P )) ⊃ r(ϕ(P )), which certainly has an injective LP proof. And rϕ (B) = r(B) by
definition. So hrϕ , σϕ i is a witness to the goodness of ϕ(P ).
Case: ϕ(P ) is atomic and P occurs. Then ϕ(P ) is just P , and must be a positive subformula of
X(P ), since the only occurrence of P is positive. Again set rϕ = r and σϕ to be the identity
substitution, which lives on every formula. We have rϕ (B) = r(B) by definition, again. We
also need the injective provability of [r(ϕ(A))]σϕ ⊃ rϕ (ϕ(B)). But this is just r(A) ⊃ r(B),
and this has an injective proof, by hypothesis. So, hrϕ , σϕ i is a witness to the goodness of
ϕ(P ) in this case. Again the induction hypothesis is not used.
Case: ϕ(P ) is i θ(P ), this is a positive subformula of X(P ), and P occurs. By hypothesis θ(P )
is good, say hrθ , σθ i is a witness to its goodness. In particular, r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ rθ (θ(B)) has an
injective proof.
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By the Lifting Lemma, for some ground proof polynomial u, u:[r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ rθ (θ(B))] has an
injective proof. To keep notation somewhat under control, say r(i) is t. Then, using the LP
Application Axiom, the following has an injective proof: (tσθ ):[r(θ(A))σθ ] ⊃ (u·tσθ ):rθ (θ(B)).
Now let rϕ be like rθ except that rϕ (i) = u · tσθ . Let σϕ = σθ . We claim that hrϕ , σϕ i is a
witness to the goodness of i θ(P ).
In verifying our claim we need to show the injective provability of r(i θ(A))σϕ ⊃ rϕ (i (θ(B)).
Since r(i)σϕ = tσϕ = tσθ , equivalently, this is (tσθ ):r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ rϕ (i):rϕ (θ(B)), which is
(tσθ ):r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ (u · tσθ ):rϕ (θ(B)). But this is (tσθ ):r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ (u · tσθ ):rθ (θ(B)), since
X(B) is properly annotated so i cannot occur in θ(B) and hence rθ and rϕ agree on θ(B).
We need that rϕ (B) = r(B). We have that rθ (B) = r(B) since hrθ , σθ i witnesses the goodness
of θ(P ). But B is a subformula of θ(B), and not vacuously, since P occurs in i θ(P ). Since
rθ and rϕ agree on θ(B), they must agree on B.
Finally σθ lives on θ(P ), so of course it lives on i θ(P ), and σϕ = σθ . This completes
verification that hrϕ , σϕ i witnesses the goodness of i θ(P ).
Case: ϕ(P ) is i θ(P ), this is a negative subformula of X(P ), and P occurs. In this case i is even,
say it is 2j. By hypothesis, θ(P ) is good, say hrθ , σθ i is a witness. Then rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ r(θ(A))σθ
has an injective proof.
As in the previous case, by the Lifting Lemma there is a ground proof polynomial u such
that u:[rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ r(θ(A))σθ ] has an injective proof. Then by the LP Application Axiom,
there is an injective proof of xj :rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ (u · xj ):r(θ(A))σθ . Let σϕ be like σθ except that
σϕ (xj ) = u · xj . Let rϕ = rθ . We claim that hrϕ , σϕ i is a witness to the goodness of i θ(P ),
that is, of 2j θ(P ).
Of course rϕ (B) = r(B) since rϕ = rθ and hrθ , σθ i witnesses the goodness of θ(P ). We
need to show the injective provability of rϕ (i θ(B)) ⊃ r(i θ(A))σϕ . Equivalently, this is
xj :rϕ (θ(B)) ⊃ (xj σϕ ):r(θ(A))σϕ (recall, all realization functions agree on the even indexes).
And this is just xj :rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ (u·xj ):r(θ(A))σϕ , so we are finished if we have that r(θ(A))σϕ =
r(θ(A))σθ . But we do have this, because r is non self-referential on variables in X(A), 2j θ(A)
is a subformula, hence xj cannot occur in r(θ(A)), and so σθ and σϕ agree on r(θ(A)).
Finally, σθ lives on θ(P ). The substitution σϕ is like σθ except that it changes xj . But then σϕ
lives on 2j θ(P ). This finishes verification that hrϕ , σϕ i witnesses the goodness of 2j θ(P ).
Case: ϕ(P ) is an implication, and this is a subformula of X(P ) in which P occurs. Since there is
at most one occurrence of P in X(P ) it must be in the antecedent or in the consequent of the
implication. Let us write θ(P ) for whichever it is of antecedent or consequent that contains
the occurrence of P , and η for the other. Then there are four cases to consider depending
on whether ϕ(P ) is θ(P ) ⊃ η or η ⊃ θ(P ), and whether ϕ(P ) is a positive or a negative
subformula of X(P ). The construction is the same in all four cases, though the justification
differs a bit. I’ll begin with what is common.
By hypothesis, θ(P ) is good. Assume hrθ , σθ i is a witness to the goodness of θ(P ). Define
a function rϕ by setting rϕ (i) = r(i)σθ if i occurs in η, and rϕ (i) = rθ (i) otherwise. Set
σϕ = σθ . We claim hrϕ , σϕ i witnesses the goodness of ϕ(P ).
It must be checked that rϕ is actually a realization function, rϕ (2i) = xi for all i. Since rθ is a
realization function, rθ (2i) = xi so the only part that needs verification is where 2i occurs in
η. Since hrθ , σθ i is a witness to the goodness of θ(P ), σθ lives on θ(P ), and hence must be the
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identity on xi such that 2i does not occur in θ(P ). Then, if 2i occurs in η it cannot occur in
θ(P ), since X(P ) is properly annotated, so in this case we have rϕ (2i) = r(2i)σθ = xi σθ = xi .
X(B) is properly annotated, θ(B) and η are distinct subformulas, and B actually occurs as
a subformula of θ(B) since P has an occurrence in θ(P ). Then no index in B can occur in
η, so rϕ (B) = rθ (B). And rθ (B) = r(B) since hrθ , σθ i witnesses the goodness of θ(P ), so
rϕ (B) = r(B).
Finally the argument divides into the four cases mentioned above. Let us consider the case
where ϕ(P ) is a positive subformula of X(P ) of the form θ(P ) ⊃ η; the other three cases
are similar and are omitted. In the case being considered, we need to show the injective
provability of r(ϕ(A))σϕ ⊃ rϕ (ϕ(B)), that is, of [r(θ(A) ⊃ η)σθ ] ⊃ [rϕ (θ(B) ⊃ η)]. Since
θ(P ) is a negative subformula of X(P ), rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ r(θ(A))σθ has an injective proof. Now,
r(θ(A) ⊃ η)σθ = r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ r(η)σθ

(9)

= r(θ(A))σθ ⊃ rϕ (η)

(10)

rϕ (θ(B) ⊃ η) = rϕ (θ(B)) ⊃ rϕ (η)

(11)

= rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ rϕ (η)

(12)

and

The result now follows from (10) and (12) because we have the injective provability of
rθ (θ(B)) ⊃ r(θ(A))σθ .
We have established that hrϕ , σϕ i witnesses the goodness of ϕ(P ) in this case.

Example 4.5 We continue Example 4.4 and work with formula X(P ) from (1). It is 2 (1 U ⊃
4 (3 P ⊃ 6 V )) ⊃ 5 W . It will be useful to introduce numbers to designate subformulas, which
we do in the following.
10
z
}|
{
9
z
}|
{
8
z
}|
{
2 (1 U ⊃ 4 (3 |{z}
P ⊃ 6 V )) ⊃ 5 W
| {z }
| {z }
| {z }
4
1
3
2
| {z }
5
|
{z
}
6
|
{z
}
7
As in (4), take A ⊃ B to be 7 R ⊃ 9 11 R, and take r as given in (2) and (7). We follow the
algorithm specified in the proof above, to compute hrϕ , σϕ i for each subformula ϕ of X(P ).
1 , 2 , 3 If i is any of 1, 2, or 3, ri = r and σi is the identity substitution, because P does not
occur.
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4 In this case too we have r4 = r and σ4 is the identity substitution.
5 This is 3 4 and is a positive subformula. There is a proof polynomial c with no variables
such that c:[r( 4 (A))σ4 ⊃ r4 ( 4 (B))] has an injective proof. That is, c:[r(A) ⊃ r(B)], or
k(x3 ) : R ⊃!k(x3 ) : k(x3 ) : R, has an injective proof. Then, set r5 to be like r4 except that
r5 (3) = [c · r(3)]σ4 = c · f (x3 ). Also σ5 = σ4 and so is the identity.
6 This is 5 ⊃ 2 . Take r6 to be the same as r5 except that r6 (6) = r(6)σ5 = x3 σ5 = x3 . Also
σ6 = σ5 is the identity.
7 This is 4 6 and is a negative subformula. There is a variable free proof polynomial d such
that d : [r6 ( 6 (B)) ⊃ r( 6 (A))σ6 ] has an injective proof. Then σ7 is like σ6 except that
σ7 (x2 ) = d · x2 , and r7 = r6 .
8 This is 3 ⊃ 7 , where the consequent has the occurrence of P . Set r8 to be the same as r7
except that r8 (1) = r(1)σ7 = g(x2 , x3 , x5 )σ7 = g(d · x2 , x3 , x5 ), and set σ8 = σ7 .
9 This is 2 8 and is a negative subformula. There is a ground proof polynomial e such that
e:[r8 ( 8 (B)) ⊃ r( 8 (A))σ8 ] has an injective proof. Set σ9 to be like σ8 except that σ9 (x1 ) =
e · x1 , and set r9 = r8 .
10 This is 9 ⊃ 1 , where 9 has the occurrence of P . Set r10 to be the same as r9 except that
r10 (5) = r(5)σ9 = h(x1 , x2 , x3 )σ9 = h(e · x1 , d · x2 , x3 ), and set σ10 = σ9 .
With all this put together, we have the following.
r10 (1)
r10 (2)
r10 (3)
r10 (4)
r10 (5)

=
=
=
=
=

g(d · x2 , x3 , x5 )
e · x1
c · f (x3 )
x2
h(e · x1 , d · x2 , x3 )

r10 (6)
r10 (7)
r10 (9)
r10 (11)

=
=
=
=

x3
k(x3 )
!k(x3 )
k(x3 )

(13)

And σ10 is the identity substitution except that σ10 (x1 ) = e · x1 and σ10 (x2 ) = d · x2 . The formula
r(X(A))σ10 is
x1:(g(d · x2 , x3 , x5 ):U ⊃ (d · x2 ):(f (x3 ):k(x3 ):R ⊃ x3:V )) ⊃ h(e · x1 , d · x2 , x3 ):W
and r10 (X(B)) is
x1:(g(d · x2 , x3 , x5 ):U ⊃ x2:((c · f (x3 )):!k(x3 ):k(x3 ):R ⊃ x3:V )) ⊃ h(e · x1 , d · x2 , x3 ):W
and I leave it to you to verify that there is an injective proof of r(X(A))σ10 ⊃ r10 (X(B)).

5

A Strengthened Version

The Replacement Theorem for LP asserts the existence of an hrϕ , σϕ i for each subformula ϕ of
X(P ) when appropriate conditions are met. As noted earlier, a stronger result has been shown—
an algorithm for constructing hrϕ , σϕ i has been given. The proof really amounts to stating this
algorithm and showing its correctness. In fact, the proof actually shows a still stronger result.
I did not give the strengthened form because doing so requires keeping track of many details,
and I thought it better for the reader to see the basic structure in a clear way first. With that
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accomplished, here is the stronger version. I would say that part 1 is the most significant. The
proof of Theorem 4.3 gives, for each subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ), a pair hrϕ , σϕ i that carries out a
replacement for that subformula. Part 1 below says this can be done uniformly, for all subformulas.
Corollary 5.1 (Replacement For LP, Strong Form) Let X(P ), A, B, and r meet conditions
1 – 4 of Theorem 4.3. Then the algorithm described in the proof produces an hrX , σX i that replaces
r(A) with r(B) at P in X(P ) within X(P ), that is, this replacement applies to the entire of X(P ).
For this hrX , σX i we have the following properties.
1. For each subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ), hrX , σX i replaces r(A) with r(B) at P in ϕ(P ) within
X(P ) (call this hereditary replacement).
2. σX meets the condition that, for each variable x the proof polynomial xσX contains at most
x as a variable (call this the no new variable condition).
3. If r is non self-referential on variables in X(B) then so is rX .
4. If W is a subformula of X(P ) that does not contain the occurrence of P , then rX (W ) =
r(W )σX .
5. If 2i occurs in a subformula of X(P ) that does not contain the occurrence of P , then xi σX =
xi .
Proof We show these items one at a time, by establishing that the proof of Theorem 4.3 already
proves them. In that proof, for each subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ), a witness to its goodness is
constructed—I will continue to denote the witness constructed for ϕ(P ) by hrϕ , σϕ i.
1. We analyze each of the cases of the proof of Theorem 4.3 and show that for each subformula
ϕ(P ) of X(P ), hrϕ , σϕ i not only is a witness to the goodness of ϕ(P ), but to the goodness
of all its subformulas as well. We refer to this property as being an hereditary witness. The
case where ϕ(P ) = X(P ) establishes the stated result.
Suppose P does not occur in ϕ(P ). In this case hrϕ , σϕ i is defined in a way that is independent
of ϕ, and so is a witness to the goodness of every subformula of X(P ) not containing P and
this includes the subformulas of ϕ(P ).
If ϕ(P ) is P , there are no proper subformulas, so this case is trivial.
Suppose ϕ(P ) is i θ(P ), where this is positive in X(P ) and P occurs. In the proof algorithm,
rϕ differs from rθ only on the index i, and i does not occur in θ(B), hence rϕ and rθ agree on
θ(B). Also σϕ and σθ are the same, and so if hrθ , σθ i is an hereditary witness to the goodness
of θ(P ), hrϕ , σϕ i must be an hereditary witness to the goodness of ϕ(P ) = i θ(P ).
Suppose ϕ(P ) is 2j θ(P ), where this is negative in X(P ) and P occurs. Then σϕ differs from
σθ only on xj , and xj does not occur in r(θ(A)) because r is non self-referential on variables
in X(A), hence σϕ and σθ agree on r(θ(A). Also rϕ = rθ . Then if hrθ , σθ i is an hereditary
witness to the goodness of θ(P ) in this case, hrϕ , σϕ i will be an hereditary witness to the
goodness of 2j θ.
Finally suppose ϕ(P ) is an implication, and P occurs. I will only consider the case where
ϕ(P ) occurs positively in X(P ), and is of the form θ(P ) ⊃ η, where P occurs in θ(P ) but not
in η. According to the implication case construction, rϕ agrees with rθ everywhere except
on η. Also σϕ = σθ . Then if hrθ , σθ i is an hereditary witness to the goodness of θ(P ), so is
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hrϕ , σϕ i. hrϕ , σϕ i is a witness to the goodness of ϕ(P ); it must still be shown that hrϕ , σϕ i is
an hereditary witness to the goodness of η. Recall that if i occurs in η then rϕ (i) = r(i)σθ .
Now let W be a subformula of η—say it is a positive subformula of X(P ), the case where it is
negative is similar. We need to establish the injective provability of r(W )σϕ ⊃ rϕ (W ). But
r(W )σϕ = r(W )σθ by definition of σϕ . And rϕ (W ) = r(W )σθ by definition of rϕ , so we need
the injective provability of r(W )σθ ⊃ r(W )σθ , and this is obvious.
2. We show that for each subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ), σϕ meets the no new variable condition, again
by considering cases in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
If ϕ(P ) does not contain P , or if ϕ(P ) is P itself, the result is immediate since in these cases
σϕ is the identity substitution.
Suppose ϕ(P ) is i θ(P ) and the result is known for θ(P ). If ϕ(P ) is a positive subformula
of X(P ) then σϕ is the same as σθ and we are done. If ϕ(P ) is a negative subformula then
σϕ is like σθ except that for j = i/2 we have σϕ (xj ) = u · xj , where u contains no variables.
Then obviously σϕ again meets the no new variable condition.
Suppose, finally, that ϕ(P ) is θ(P ) ⊃ η, a positive subformula of X(P ), and the result is
known for θ(P ). The other implication cases are similar, and are omitted. In this case σϕ is
just σθ , and we are done.
3. Assume r is non self-referential on variables in X(B). We show that for each subformula ϕ(P )
of X(P ), rϕ is non self-referential on variables in X(B) (note that the assumption concerns
X(B) and not ϕ(B)). Of course this involves checking each case in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Suppose P does not occur in ϕ(P ), or ϕ(P ) is P itself. In both of these cases, rϕ = r so we
simply appeal to the assumption that r is non self-referential on variables in X(B).
Suppose ϕ(P ) is i θ(P ), P occurs, and the result is known for θ(P ). If ϕ(P ) is a negative
subformula of X(P ) then rϕ = rθ and we are done. Now suppose ϕ(P ) is a positive subformula
of X(P ). Then rϕ is the same as rθ except on i, so if rϕ failed to be non self-referential on
variables in X(B) it must be that i θ(B) is a subformula of some 2n Z(B) in X(B), and
the variable xn occurs in rϕ (i). But rϕ (i) = u · (r(i)σθ ), where u has no variables. Since σθ
meets the no new variable condition, r(i)σθ has the same variables as r(i). But this violates
the condition that r is non self-referential on variables in X(B).
Finally suppose ϕ(P ) is θ(P ) ⊃ η where P occurs in θ(P ), and the result is known for θ(P ),
that is, rθ is non self-referential on variables in X(B). As usual, the other implication cases
are similar and are omitted. In this case rϕ (i) = r(i)σθ if i occurs in η, and otherwise rϕ
agrees with rθ . We derive a contradiction from the assumption that rϕ fails to be non selfreferential on variables in X(B). So, suppose 2i W is a subformula of X(B) and xi occurs
in rϕ (W ). Then xi occurs in rϕ (j) for some j in W . Now either j is not part of η or it
is. If it is not part of η, rϕ (j) = rθ (j), and the assumption that rθ is non self-referential on
variables in X(B) is violated. If j is part of η then rϕ (j) = r(j)σθ . If xi occurs in this, it
must also occur in r(j) since σθ meets the no new variable condition. But this violates the
assumption that r is non self-referential on variables in X(B).
4. and 5. These items are shown simultaneously. Let W be a subformula of X(P ) that does
not contain P . We show by an analysis of the cases in the proof of Theorem 4.3 that for
each subformula ϕ(P ) of X(P ) with W as a subformula, and for the corresponding hrϕ , σϕ i,
rϕ (W ) = r(W )σϕ and if 2i occurs in W then xi σϕ = xi . Then the results stated in the
Theorem are the special case where ϕ(P ) is X(P ).
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First consider the case where P does not occur in ϕ(P ). Then σϕ is the identity substitution,
and rϕ = r. Then of course rϕ (W ) = r(W )σϕ , and xi σϕ = xi whether or not 2i is in W .
For the remaining cases, assume P occurs in ϕ(P ).
If ϕ(P ) is P , there is no subformula W not containing P .
Suppose ϕ(P ) is i θ(P ), a positive subformula of X(P ). In this case, rϕ agrees with rθ except
on i, and σϕ = σθ . Suppose also that the result is known for θ(P ). Since W is a subformula
of ϕ(P ) not containing P , while ϕ(P ) does contain P , W must be a proper subformula, and
hence a subformula of θ(P ). In particular, W does not contain i . Then rϕ (W ) = r(W )σϕ
since rθ (W ) = r(W )σθ . And if 2k occurs in W , xk σϕ = xk , because xk σθ = xk .
Suppose ϕ(P ) is 2j θ(P ), a negative subformula of X(P ). In this case rϕ = rθ , and σϕ agrees
with σθ except on xj . And suppose the result is known for θ(P ). Again since W does not
contain P but is a subformula of ϕ(P ) which does contain P , it must be a proper subformula,
and hence a subformula of θ(P ). Then rθ (W ) = r(W )σθ . Since r is non self-referential on
variables in X(A), xj cannot occur in r(W ), and so rϕ (W ) = r(W )σϕ . Also if 2k occurs in
W , since X(B) is properly annotated, k 6= j, so xk σϕ = xk σθ = xk .
Finally suppose ϕ(P ) is an implication. As usual we only consider the case where ϕ(P ) is
θ(P ) ⊃ η, P occurs in θ(P ) but not in η, and this is a positive subformula of X(P ). And we
suppose the result is known for θ(P ) and for η. The definition of hrϕ , σϕ i in the present case
is as follows. If i occurs in η then rϕ (i) = r(i)σθ and rϕ (i) = rθ (i) otherwise. And σϕ = σθ .
Since W is a subformula that does not contain P , while ϕ(P ) does contain P , W must be a
proper subformula, and hence is either a subformula of θ(P ) or of η. If W is a subformula
of θ(P ) then since X(P ) is properly annotated, rϕ (W ) = rθ (W ) = r(W )σθ = r(W )σϕ , using
the fact that the result is known for θ(P ). And if W is a subformula of η then rϕ (W ) =
r(W )σθ = r(W )σϕ , by definition of rϕ . Finally, if 2i occurs in W , then since the result is
known for both θ(P ) and η, then xi σϕ = xi σθ = xi .

Example 5.2 I leave it to you to check that the replacement r10 and the substitution σ10 constructed in Example 4.5 do meet the conditions given in this theorem.
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